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Fitzgerald: The rich are different from you and me
Hemingway: Yes, they have more money
It is known that asset exchange models with symmetric interaction between
agents show either a Gibbs/log-normal distribution of assets among the agents
or condensation of the entire wealth in the hands of a single agent, depending
upon the rules of exchange. Here we explore the effects of introducing asym-
metry in the interaction between agents with different amounts of wealth (i.e.,
the rich behave differently from the poor). This can be implemented in several
ways: e.g., (1) in the net amount of wealth that is transferred from one agent
to another during an exchange interaction, or (2) the probability of gaining
vs. losing a net amount of wealth from an exchange interaction. We propose
that, in general, the introduction of asymmetry leads to Pareto-like power law
distribution of wealth.
1 Introduction
“The history of all hitherto existing society is a history of social hier-
archy” – Joseph Persky [1]
As is evident from the above quotation, the inequality of wealth (and income)
distribution in society has long been common knowledge. However, it was
not until the 1890s that the nature of this inequality was sought to be quan-
titatively established. Vilfredo Pareto collected data about the distribution
of income across several European countries, and stated that, for the high-
income range, the probability that a given individual has income greater than
or equal to x is P>(x) ∼ x
−α, α being known as the Pareto exponent [2].
Pareto had observed α to vary around 1.5 for the data available to him and
believed α ≃ 1.5 to be universal (i.e., valid across different societies). How-
ever, it is now known that α can vary over a very wide range [3]; furthermore,
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Fig. 1. Wealth and income distribution in India: (Left) Rank ordered wealth distri-
bution during the period 2002-2004 plotted on a double-logarithmic scale, showing
the wealth of the k-th ranked richest person (or household) in India against the rank
k (with rank 1 corresponding to the wealthiest person) as per surveys conducted
by Business Standard [7] in Dec 31, 2002 (squares), Aug 31, 2003 (triangles) and
Aug 31, 2004 (circles). The broken line having a slope of −1.23 is shown for visual
reference. (Right) Cumulative income distribution during the period 1929-30 as per
information obtained from Income Tax and Super Tax data given in Ref. [8]. The
plot has Gibbs/log-normal form at the lower income range, and a power law tail
with Pareto exponent α ≃ 1.15 for the highest income range.
for the low-income end, the distribution follows either a log-normal [4] or ex-
ponential distribution [5]. Similar power law tails have been observed for the
wealth distribution in different societies. While wealth and income are obvi-
ously not independent of each other, the exact relation between the two is not
very clear. While wealth is analogous to voltage, being the net value of assets
owned at a given point of time, income is analogous to current, as it is the
net flow of wages, dividends, interest payments, etc. over a period of time. In
general, it has been observed that wealth is more unequally distributed than
income. Therefore, the Pareto exponent for wealth distribution is smaller than
that for income distribution.
Most of the empirical studies on income and wealth distribution have been
done for advanced capitalist economies, such as, Japan and USA. It is inter-
esting to note that similar distributions can be observed even for India [6],
which until recently had followed a planned economy. As income tax and other
records about individual holdings are not publicly available in India, we had
to resort to indirect methods. As explained in detail in Ref. [6], the Pareto
exponent for the power-law tail of the wealth distribution was determined
from the rank-ordered plot of wealth of the richest Indians [Fig. 1 (left)]. This
procedure yielded an average Pareto exponent of ≃ 1/1.23 = 0.82. A similar
exercise carried out for the income distribution in the highest income range
produced a Pareto exponent α ≃ 1.51. Surprisingly, this is identical to what
Pareto had thought to be the universal value of α. Comparing this with histor-
ical data of income distribution in India [8], we again observe the power-law
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tail although with a different exponent [Fig. 1 (right)]. In addition, we note
that the low-income range has a log-normal or Gibbs form very similar to
what has been observed for advanced capitalist economies [4]. In the subse-
quent sections, we will try to reproduce these observed features of wealth &
income distributions through models belonging to the general class of asset
exchange models.
2 Asset exchange models
Asset exchange models belong to a class of simple models of a closed economic
system, where the total wealth available for exchange,W , and the total num-
ber of agents, N , trading among each other, are fixed [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Each
agent i has some wealth Wi(t) associated with it at time step t. Starting from
an arbitrary initial distribution of wealth (Wi(0), i = 1, 2, 3, . . . .), during each
time step two randomly chosen agents i and j exchange wealth, subject to
the constraint that the combined wealth of the two agents is conserved by the
trade, and that neither of the two has negative wealth after the trade (i.e.,
debt is not allowed). In general, one of the players will gain and the other
player will lose as a result of the trade. If we consider an arbitrarily chosen
pair of agents (i, j) who trade at a time step t, resulting in a net gain of
wealth by agent i, then the change in their wealth as a result of trading is:
Wi(t+ 1) =Wi(t) +∆W ;Wj(t+ 1) = Wj(t)−∆W,
where, ∆W is the net wealth exchanged between the two agents.
Different exchange models are defined based on how ∆W is related to
[Wi(t),Wj(t)]. For the random exchange model, the wealth exchanged is a
random fraction of the combined wealth [Wi(t) +Wj(t)], while for the min-
imum exchange model, it is a random fraction of the wealth of the poorer
agent, i.e., min[Wi(t),Wj(t)]]. The asymptotic distribution for the former is
exponential, while the latter shows a condensation of the entire wealth W
into the hands of a single agent [Fig. 2 (left)]. Neither of these reflect the em-
pirically observed distributions of wealth in society, discussed in the previous
section.
Introducing savings propensity in the exchange mechanism, whereby agents
don’t put at stake (and are therefore liable to lose) their entire wealth, but put
in reserve a fraction of their current holdings, does not significantly change
the steady state distribution [10]. By increasing the savings fraction (i.e., the
fraction of wealth of an agent that is not being put at stake during a trade),
one observes that the steady-state distribution becomes non-monotonic, al-
though the tail still decays exponentially. However, randomly assigning differ-
ent savings fractions (between [0,1]) to agents lead to a power-law tail in the
asymptotic distribution [13].
This result raises the question of whether it is the differential ability of agents
to save that gives rise to the Pareto distribution. Or, turning the question
around, we may ask whether the rich save more. This question has been the
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Fig. 2. (Left) Asymptotic wealth distribution for the random exchange model
(τ = 0: exponential distribution) and the minimum exchange model (τ = 1: conden-
sation). (Right) Power law wealth distribution with exponent ≃ −1.5 for the asym-
metric exchange model with τ = 0.99. All figures shown for N = 1000, t = 1 × 107
iterations, averaged over 2000 realizations.
subject of much controversy, but recent work seems to have answered this in
the affirmative [14]. As mentioned in a leading economics textbook, savings
is the greatest luxury of all [15] and the amount of savings in a household
rises with income. In terms of the asset exchange models, one can say that an
agent with more wealth is more likely to save (or saves a higher fraction of its
wealth). Implementing this principle appropriately in the exchange rules, one
arrives at the asymmetric exchange model.
3 Asymmetric exchange model
The model is defined by the following exchange rules specifying the change in
wealth, WA(t+1)−WA(t), of agent A who wins a net amount of wealth after
trading with agent B [WB(t+ 1)−WB(t) = WA(t)−WA(t+ 1)]:
WA(t+ 1) = WA(t) + ǫ(1− τ [1 −
WA(t)
WB(t)
])WB(t), if WA(t) ≤WB(t),
=WA(t) + ǫWB(t), otherwise,
where ǫ is a random number between 0 and 1, specifying the fraction of wealth
that has been exchanged. For τ = 0, this is the random exchange model, while
for τ = 1, it is identical to the minimum exchange model [Fig. 2 (left)]. In the
general case, 0 < τ < 1, the relation between the agents trading with each
other is asymmetric, the richer agent having more power to dictate terms of
trade than the poorer agent. The parameter τ (thrift) measures the degree to
which the richer agent is able to use this power.
As τ is increased from 0 to 1, the asymptotic distribution of wealth is observed
to change from exponential to a condensate (all wealth belonging to a single
agent). However, at the transition between these two very different types
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Fig. 3. (Left) Asymptotic wealth distribution (inset shows the cumulative distri-
bution) with a power-law tail having Pareto exponent α ≃ 1.5, for the asymmetric
exchange model with τ distributed uniformly over the unit interval [0, 1] among N
agents (N = 1000, t = 1 × 107 iterations, averaged over 104 realizations). (Right)
Asymptotic wealth distribution for model having asymmetric winning probability
with β = 0.1 [pluses] (slope of the power-law curve is 1.30 ± 0.05) and β = 0.01
[crosses] (slope of the power-law curve is 1.27 ± 0.05). (N = 1000, t = 1.5 × 107
iterations, averaged over 5000 realizations).
of distribution (τ → 1) one observes a power-law distribution ! As seen in
Fig. 2 (right), the power-law extends for almost the entire range of wealth
and has a Pareto exponent ≃ 0.5. This is possibly the simplest asset exchange
model that can give rise to a power-law distribution. Note that, unlike other
models [13], here one does not need to assume the distribution of a parameter
among agents.
However, the Pareto exponent for this model is quite small compared to those
empirically observed in real economies. This situation is remedied if instead
of considering a fixed value of τ for all agents, we consider the heterogeneous
case where τ is distributed randomly among agents according to a quenched
distribution. For an uniform distribution of τ , the steady-state distribution
of wealth has a power-law tail with α = 1.5 [Fig. 3 (left)], which is the value
predicted by Pareto, while at the region corresponding to low wealth, the
distribution is exponential. By changing the nature of the random distribu-
tion, one observes power-law tails with different exponents. For example, for
P (τ) ∼ τ , the resulting distribution has a Pareto exponent α ∼ 1.3, while for
P (τ) ∼ τ−2/3, one obtains α ∼ 2.1. A non-monotonic U-shaped distribution
of τ yields α ∼ 0.73. However, the fact that even with these extremely dif-
ferent distributions of τ one always obtains a power-law tail for the wealth
distribution, underlines the robustness of our result.
4 Asymmetric Winning Probability Model
Asymmetry in the interaction between agents (as a function of their wealth)
can also be introduced through the probability that an agent will gain net
wealth from an exchange. Consider a variant of the minimum exchange model
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where the probability that agent A (wealth WA) will win a net amount in an
exchange with B (wealth WB) is
p(A|A,B) =
1
1 + exp(β[WA(t)WB(t) − 1])
,
where 1β is the indifference to relative wealth (for details see Ref. [12]). For β
= 0, i.e., p(A|A,B) = 12 , the minimum exchange model is retrieved, where, in
the steady state, the entire wealth belongs to a single agent (condensation).
However, for a finite value of β, the poorer agent has a higher probability of
winning. For large β, the asymptotic distribution is exponential, similar to the
random exchange model. At the transition between these two very different
types of distributions (condensate and exponential) we observe a power-law
distribution of wealth [Fig. 3 (right)].
5 Discussion
The two models discussed here for generating Pareto-like distribution of
wealth are both instances of the “Rich Are Different” principle, implemented
in the formalism of asset exchange models. It is interesting to note that other
recently proposed models for generating Pareto law also use this principle,
whether this is in terms of kinetic theory as in the present paper [16, 17] or in
a network context [18, 19]. This leads us to conclude that asymmetry in agent-
agent interactions is a crucial feature of models for generating distributions
having power-law tails.
To conclude, we have presented two models illustrating the general principle
of how Pareto-like distribution of wealth (as observed in empirical observa-
tions in society) can be reproduced by implementing asymmetric interactions
between agents in asset exchange models. In the models presented here the
asymmetry is based on wealth of agents, with the rich agents behaving dif-
ferently from the poor, either in terms of net wealth changing hands, or the
probability of gaining net wealth out of a trade. One of the models is possibly
the simplest asset exchange model that gives a power-law distribution. The
results are also very robust, the power law being observed for a wide vari-
ety of parameter distributions. The different values of α obtained for different
parameter distributions is a possible explanation of why different Pareto expo-
nents have been measured in different societies, as well as in the same society
at different times.
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